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Motivated by an application in highway pricing, we consider the problem that consists
in setting profit-maximizing tolls on a clique subset of a multicommodity transportation
network. We formulate the problem as a linear mixed integer program and propose strong
valid inequalities, some of which define facets of the two-commodity polyhedron. The
numerical efficiency of these inequalities is assessed by embedding themwithin a branch-
and-cut framework.
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1. Introduction
The paradigm of pricing, either for improving the performance of infrastructures, or for maximizing the revenue of a
private firm, pervades the economics literature. In the present paper, we consider the problem faced by a highwaymanager
that seeks to maximize the revenue raised from tolls set on a network, while anticipating that users will travel on paths
that maximize their individual utilities. This situation is closely related to the problem known as ‘product line pricing’
(see [1–5]), which is challenging from both the theoretical and computational points of view. Some years ago, Labbé et al. [6]
recognized that the network pricing problem fits the framework of bilevel programming, a branch of optimization concerned
with the solution of nonconvex programs involving two noncooperative agents, and that is akin to a leader–follower, or
Stackelberg, game. This approach led to studies that focused on the combinatorial nature of network pricing, either in its
original formulation or variants thereof. Representative of this approach are the works of Bouhtou et al. [7], van Hoesel
et al. [8], Grigoriev et al. [9], Heilporn et al. [10,11], Kohli and Krishnamurti [12] and Roch et al. [13].
In the present paper, we consider a variant of the problem where all roads controlled by an authority are connected and
form a path, as occurs in a toll highway. Assuming that tolls are levied with respect to all possible combinations of entry and
exit points on the highway, one may focus on networks where a virtual arc is created for each entry–exit combination, and
thus form an ‘inner’ clique. Shortest paths that do not go through the highway are represented by arcs linking the various
origins and destinations, and form an ‘outer’ clique (see Fig. 1). The aim of this paper is to provide a better understanding
of the Clique Pricing Problem and to develop algorithmic tools that can be transposed to situations arising in the field of
revenue management (see [14]). More precisely, we are interested in the polyhedral structure of a specific Network Pricing
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Fig. 1. Topology of the Clique Pricing Problem, where toll arcs are dashed and toll free arcs are solid. Nodes of the ‘inner’ clique (right) are the entry–exit
nodes on the highway, while nodes of the ‘outer’ clique (left) represent various origins and destinations.
Problem. Preliminary results in that direction were obtained by Heilporn et al. [11], who provided a theoretical study of the
single commodity Clique Pricing Problem.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the Clique Pricing Problem, together with its formulation;
Section 3 dealswith strong valid inequalities derived from the underlying network structure of themodel; Section 4 provides
proofs that the inequalities, as well as several constraints of the initial model, define facets of the two-commodity problem;
finally, numerical results (Section 5) show that several of the valid inequalities are efficient, in the sense that their integration
within a branch-and-cut scheme decreases the integrality gap, the CPU time, and the number of nodes explored in the
resulting implicit enumeration process.
2. Mathematical formulation of the Clique Pricing Problem
Let us consider a linear highway composed of n entry–exit nodes, over which may transitm commodities, each of them
associated with an origin–destination pair k ∈ K and a demand ηk. To each entry–exit pair correspond an arc a ∈ A and a
commodity-specific cost cka + ta, where ta denotes the toll. Commodities can either transit through the toll network, at cost
cka+ ta, or use alternative direct paths at cost uk. Hence commodities who travel through the highway choose a single toll arc,
i.e., they are not allowed to leave the highway and re-enter it later on. Assuming that all combinations of origin–destination
and entry–exit nodes are present, the topology of the network is that of two cliques linked by ‘access nodes’ (see Fig. 1). The
‘outer’ clique is related to demand, while the ‘inner’ clique is a representation of the linear highway network.
Following Dewez [15], the Clique Pricing Problem can be formulated as the bilevel program:
CPP : max
t,x
−
k∈K
−
a∈A
ηktaxka (1)
subject to:
ta ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A (2)
(x, y) ∈ argmin
x¯,y¯
−
k∈K
−
a∈A
(cka + ta)x¯ka + uky¯k

(3)
subject to:−
a∈A
x¯ka + y¯k = 1 ∀k ∈ K (4)
x¯ka ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A (5)
y¯k ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K. (6)
At the upper level, the authority seeks to maximize the profits earned by imposing tolls ta on the inner clique’s arcs. At
the lower level, commodities are assigned to shortest paths with respect to the sum of fixed costs and tolls. The flow
constraints (4) ensure that each commodity k ∈ K is assigned either to a toll path a of the inner clique (xka = 1), or to
a toll free path of the outer clique (yk = 1). Note that, since we assume that any commodity chooses the shortest path from
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its origin to its destination, lower level solutions represent origin–destination paths carrying either no flow or the total
origin–destination flow. Since the matrix of constraints is totally unimodular, flow proportions xka and y
k can be assumed
either discrete or continuous. It has been proved that the Clique Pricing Problem isNP -hard (see [16]), although particular
cases are polynomially solvable (see [15]).
Recently, Heilporn [16,11] proposed a linear MIP (Mixed Integer Program) formulation of the Clique Pricing Problem. In
contrast with the CPP arc flow formulation, the optimality of the lower level problem is now expressed in terms of path
flows. Further, this model is linearized through the use of ‘revenue’ variables pka defined as
pka =

ta if commodity k uses arc a ∈ A
0 otherwise, (7)
and also dispenses with the variables yk. It can be described as
CP : max
p
−
k∈K
−
a∈A
ηkpka (8)
subject to:−
a∈A
xka ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ K (9)
−
b∈A
(pkb + ckbxkb)+ uk

1−
−
b∈A
xkb

≤ ta + cka ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A (10)
pka ≤ Mkaxka ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A (11)
ta − pka ≤ Na(1− xka) ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A (12)
pka ≤ ta ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A (13)
pka ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A (14)
xka ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A, (15)
where Mka and Na denote ‘big-M ’ constants. These can be set to M
k
a = max{0, uk − cka} and Na = maxk∈K Mka for all
k ∈ K, a ∈ A, respectively (see [16]). Constraints (10) impose that, for each commodity k ∈ K , the cost of the optimal
path is smaller than or equal to the cost of any other path for this commodity. Constraints (11) to (13) come from the model
linearization, and ensure that pka = taxka for all k ∈ K and a ∈ A.
Let one identifyAwith a set of products,K with a set of purchaser segments, and uk− cka def= rka with ‘reservation prices’
that represent themaximal price that purchaser k iswilling to spend for product a. Then, if the ‘utility’ of purchaser k towards
product a is set to the difference between the reservation price rka and the actual product price p
k
a, the Clique Pricing Problem
can be cast within the framework of product pricing, which has been studied in the economics literature (see [1–3,12,17] or
[4]). For one, Shioda et al. [4] proposed a MIP formulation that coincides with CP , modulo the substitution of the Shortest
Path constraints (10) by−
b∈A:b≠a
((uk − ckb)xkb − pkb) ≥ (uk − cka)
−
b∈A:b≠a
xkb − ta ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A, (16)
which, after adding the term (uk − cka)xka − pka to both sides of the inequality, can be rewritten as−
b∈A
(pkb + ckbxkb) ≤ ta + cka
−
b∈A
xkb + pka. (17)
If one expresses constraints (10) as
−
b∈A
(pkb + ckbxkb) ≤ ta + cka − uk

1−
−
b∈A
xkb

, (18)
it can be readily verified that the right-hand side of (18) is smaller than or equal to that of (17), whenever cka is less than u
k.
Note that, in a pre-processing step, one could have set xka = 0 for all a ∈ A and k ∈ K such that cka > uk, since such an
arc does not contribute positively to the objective function. Hence one may conclude that the Shortest Path constraints are
stronger than (16). In particular, if a consumer k ∈ K refrains from buying, constraints (16) are redundant for this index k,
while constraints (10) impose uk ≤ cka+ta for all toll arcs a ∈ A. In a related paper, Shioda et al. [18] described the purchaser’s
behaviour through probabilistic choice models. From the latter, they derived several mixed integer programming programs
that they compared in terms of optimal solutions and computational times.
396 G. Heilporn et al. / Discrete Optimization 8 (2011) 393–410
Shioda et al. [4] also introduced three sets of valid inequalities, the first set corresponding to optimality cuts and the next
two to feasibility cuts:
pk1a ≥ mink∈K {u
k − cka}xk1a ∀k1 ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A (19)
pk1a ≤ (uk2 − ck2a )xk2a + (uk1 − ck1a )(1− xk2a ) ∀k1, k2 ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A (20)
xk2a ≥ xk1a ∀k1, k2 ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A that satisfy the conditions:
uk2 − ck2a ≥ uk1 − ck1a ,
ck2a − ck1a > ck2b − ck1b ∀b ∈ A \ {a}. (21)
Inequalities (19) and (20) provide lower and upper bounds on the product price variables pka, which depend on the
reservation prices uk − cka . Inequalities (21) link the flow variables xka associated with purchaser segments. We refer the
reader to Shioda et al. [4] for further details concerning these inequalities.
3. Valid inequalities
Inequalities (10) ensure that only shortest paths are allowed to carry positive flow. As shown in [11], these inequalities
can be strengthened by considering interrelationships between the toll arcs of the network. Exploiting the interactions
between pairs of commodities, we propose a further strengthening of the inequalities.
Proposition 1 (SSP Inequalities). For any subset S of A, for any a ∈ A and for any pair of commodities k1, k2 ∈ K , the
inequalities
−
b∈A
(pk1b + ck1b xk1b )+ uk1

1−
−
b∈A
xk1b

≤ ta + ck1a +
−
b∈A\(S∪{a})
(pk2b + (ck1b − ck1a )xk2b ) (22)
−
b∈A
(pk1b + ck1b xk1b )+ uk1

1−
−
b∈A
xk1b

≤ uk1 +
−
b∈A\S
(pk2b + (ck1b − uk1)xk2b ) (23)
are valid for CP .
Proof. If xk1b = 0 for all b ∈ A, then:
(i) If there exists b ∈ A \ (S ∪ {a}) such that xk2b = 1, (22)–(23) yield uk1 ≤ ta+ pk2b + ck1b and uk1 ≤ pk2b + ck1b , respectively.
As pk2b = tb by (12) and (13), the inequalities imply that the cost of the path containing b ∈ A must be larger than or
equal to the cost of the toll free path for commodity k1, and are valid by (10) and (14).
(ii) In all other cases, (22)–(23) yield uk1 ≤ ta + ck1a and uk1 ≤ uk1 , respectively, which are valid by (10).
Now assume that there exists b ∈ A such that xk1b = 1.
(i) If there exists d ∈ A \ (S ∪ {a}) such that xk2d = 1, (22)–(23) yield pk1b + ck1b ≤ ta + pk2d + ck1d and pk1b + ck1b ≤ pk2d + ck1d
respectively. As pk1b = tb and pk2d = td by (12) and (13), the inequalities state that the path containing b ∈ Amust not
be more expensive than the path containing d ∈ A for commodity k1, and are valid by (10) and (14).
(ii) In all other cases (i.e., if there does not exist any d ∈ A\(S∪{a}) such that xk2d = 1), (22)–(23) become pk1b +ck1b ≤ ta+ck1a
and pk1b + ck1b ≤ uk1 respectively. Thus the path containing b ∈ Amust not be more expensive than any other path for
commodity k1, and the validity of the inequalities follows from (10). 
Note that, in the above theorem, the only relevant constraints are those that satisfy ck1b ≤ ck1a for all b ∈ A \ (S ∪ {a}), since
the remaining ones are weaker than the Shortest Path constraints.
Although the possible number of subsets S, and hence the number of constraints (22)–(23), is exponential, it is yet
possible to determine the most violated constraint in polynomial time. To outline the separation procedure for a given
commodity k1, we observe that, for a distinct commodity k2 and an arc a, the right-hand side of (22) will be minimal if we
insert into the setA \ (S ∪ {a}) all arcs for which pk2b + (ck1b − ck1a )xk2b is negative, i.e., (pk2b + ck1b xk2b )/xk2b < ck1a . If the scalars
(pk2b + ck1b xk2b )/xk2b and the costs ck1a are both sorted in increasing order (the latter operation can be performed off-line), then
it becomes straightforward to update the optimal set S when switching from one candidate toll arc to its successor in the
ordered list. The complexity of the separation procedure for a commodity k1 ∈ K is thus dominated by the sort operation,
and is in the order of O(|K||A| log |A|).
The Profit Upper Bound inequalities (11) can also be strengthened by considering pairs of commodities. In this context,
we say that two toll arcs a and b are compatible with respect to commodities k1 and k2 if there exists a feasible solution of
CP where xk1b = xk2a = 1. In this case, we write (b, k1) ∼ (a, k2), and (b, k1) ≁ (a, k2) otherwise.
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Lemma 1. Let ck1b ≤ uk1 , ck2b ≤ uk2 , ck2a ≤ uk2 and ck1a ≤ uk1 . Then, (b, k1) ∼ (a, k2) if and only if ck2a − ck1a ≤ ck2b − ck1b .
Proof. If xk1b = xk2a = 1, we must have that tb + ck1b ≤ ta + ck1a and ta + ck2a ≤ tb + ck2b by the Shortest Path constraints (10).
This yields ck1b − ck1a ≤ ta − tb ≤ ck2b − ck2a .
Conversely, if ck2b − ck2a ≥ 0, setting xk1b = xk2a = 1, tb = pk1b = 0, ta = pk2a = ck2b − ck2a and td = Nd for all d ∈ A \ {a, b}
yields a feasible solution of CP . Indeed, the Shortest Path constraints (10) imply that
pk1b + ck1b ≤ ta + ck1a ⇐⇒ ck1b ≤ ck2b − ck2a + ck1a
pk2a + ck2a ≤ tb + ck2b ⇐⇒ ck2b − ck2a + ck2a ≤ ck2b ,
which are valid since ck2a − ck1a ≤ ck2b − ck1b . The remaining Shortest Path constraints hold since variables td have been set
sufficiently large for all d ∈ A \ {a, b}. Further, ck2b ≤ uk2 ensures that pk2a ≤ Mk2a , i.e., constraints (11) are satisfied. In the
same way, if ck2b − ck2a < 0, the point xk1b = xk2a = 1, ta = 0, tb = ck2a − ck2b and td = Nd for all d ∈ A \ {a, b} is a feasible
solution of CP . 
Lemma 2. If Mk2a ≥ Mk1a and xk1a = 1, there exists b ∈ A such that xk2b = 1 and tb + ck2b ≤ ta + ck2a .
Proof. Since xk1a = 1, one has ta = pk1a ≤ Mk1a by (11)–(13). Hence ta ≤ Mk2a , i.e., the path containing toll arc a ∈ A is not
more expensive than the toll free path for commodity k2. 
To derive the next inequalities, we introduce the set A>a = {b ∈ A : ck2b − ck1b > ck2a − ck1a } of toll arcs b ∈ A such
that (b, k1) ∼ (a, k2) and (b, k2) ≁ (a, k1), together with its complement A<a (for the sake of readability, we adopted this
notation rather than the alternativeA≤a ).
Proposition 2 (SPUB Inequalities). If, for a given triple (k1, k2, a) such that M
k1
a ≤ Mk2a , there exists no toll arc b ≠ a that
satisfies ck2a − ck1a = ck2b − ck1b , then the following inequalities hold:
pk2a ≤ Mk2a xk2a + (Mk2a −Mk1a )
 −
b∈A<a \{a}
(xk2b − xk1b )− xk1a
 (24)
pk2a ≤ Mk2a xk2a + (Mk2a −Mk1a )
 −
b∈A<a \{a}
(xk2b − xk1b )− xk1a
+ (Mk2b∗ −Mk1b∗ ) −
b∈A>a :Mk2b ≥M
k1
b
(xk2b − xk1b ), (25)
with b∗ = argmin
b∈A>a :Mk2b ≥M
k1
b
{ck1b − ck2b }.
Note that, for given k1, k2 ∈ K and a ∈ A, inequality (24) (resp. (25)) is not redundant if and only if xk1b = 1 = xk2a for
b = a (resp. b = a or b ∈ A>a ), and helps to tighten the upper bound on pk2a in this case.
Proof. If
∑
b∈A<a \{a}(x
k2
b − xk1b )− xk1a is non-negative, then the corresponding inequality (24) is redundant by (11). Similarly,
if
∑
b∈A<a \{a}(x
k2
b − xk1b )− xk1a and
∑
b∈A>a :Mk2b ≥M
k1
b
(xk2b − xk1b ) are non-negative, then (25) is redundant.
Assume that
∑
b∈A<a \{a}(x
k2
b − xk1b ) − xk1a < 0, i.e., (i) there exists b ∈ A<a such that xk1b = 1, and (ii) xk2b = 0 for all
b ∈ A<a \ {a}. By Lemma 2, (i) implies that there exists d ∈ A such that xk2d = 1. Further, Lemma 1 and the definition of
the setA<a yield d ∈ A<a , thus d = a by (ii), i.e., xk2a = 1. Now, from Lemma 1 and the assumption that there does not exist
any b ∈ A \ {a} such that ck2b − ck1b = ck2a − ck1a , one obtains that b = a, i.e., xk1a = 1. Hence inequalities (24)–(25) become
pk2a ≤ Mk1a , whose validity follows from (11)–(13).
Concerning inequality (25), it can occur that
∑
b∈A>a :Mk2b ≥M
k1
b
(xk2b − xk1b ) < 0, which means that (i) there exists b ∈ A>a
withMk2b ≥ Mk1b such that xk1b = 1 and (ii) xk2b = 0 for all b ∈ A>a withMk2b ≥ Mk1b . In this situation, Lemma 2 implies that
there must exist d ∈ A such that xk2d = 1. By contradiction, assume that d ∈ A>a with Mk2d < Mk1d . Lemma 1 implies that
ck2d − ck1d ≤ ck2b − ck1b , which cannot occur since uk2 − uk1 < ck2d − ck1d and ck2b − ck1b ≤ uk2 − uk1 . As (ii) also holds, one
concludes that d ∈ A<a .
If d ∈ A<a \ {a}, inequality (25) becomes 0 ≤ (Mk2a −Mk1a )− (Mk2b∗ −Mk1b∗ ), which is true since b ∈ A>a . Otherwise d = a,
i.e., xk2a = 1, and (25) yields pk2a ≤ Mk1b∗+ck2b∗−ck2a , which is also valid. Indeed, constraint (10) imposes that pk2a +ck2a ≤ tb+ck2b .
Further, pk1b ≤ Mk1b by (11). As tb = pk1b by (12) and (13), one has pk2a ≤ Mk1b +ck2b −ck2a . The result follows from the definition
of b∗. 
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Proposition 3 (SPUB Inequalities). Under the assumptions of Proposition 2 the following inequalities are valid:
pk2a − pk1a ≤ Mk2a
−
b∈A<a
(xk2b − xk1b ) (26)
pk2a − pk1a ≤ Mk2a
−
b∈A<a
(xk2b − xk1b )+ (Mk2b∗ −Mk1b∗ )
−
b∈A>a :Mk2b ≥M
k1
b
(xk2b − xk1b ). (27)
Note that, for given k1, k2 ∈ K and a ∈ A, (26)–(27) are not redundant either if xk1a = xk2a = 1 or if xk1b = 1 = xk2a for
b ∈ A>a such thatMk2b ≥ Mk1b . Since the proof is similar to that of Proposition 2, it is omitted.
4. Assessing the valid inequalities
The valid inequalities introduced in Section 3 are strong. Indeed, we will show that they define facets of the convex hull
P of feasible solutions to a two-commodity Clique Pricing Problem, defined as
P = conv{(t; pk1; pk2; xk1; xk2) ∈ Rn+ × R2n+ × {0, 1}2n : (9)–(15)},
where boldface letters denote real vectors.
Our results are dependent on the choice of big-M constants in the MIP formulation of clique pricing. While we let
Mka = max{0, uk−cka} as before, we setNa = maxk∈K{Mka }+ϵ, for some arbitrarily small number ϵ. This latter choice, which
differs from that in Section 2, is motivated by the fact that some flexibility with respect to the toll variables ta is required
whenever we encounter the degenerate situation where some toll arc carries no flow. For sufficiently small ϵ, this strategy
leaves the set of optimal solutions unchanged.
In what follows, ea will denote a unit vector in the direction a, and the following technical assumptions will hold.
Assumption 1. Mka > 0 for every k ∈ K and a ∈ A.
Assumption 2. For all b ∈ A, eitherMk1b ≠ Mk2b , or there exists d ∈ A \ {b} such that ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d .
Both assumptions ensure that the convex hull is not contained in some hyperplane, either pka = 0 in the former case, or−
b∈A
(pk1b + ck1b xk1b )+ uk1

1−
−
b∈A
xk1b

+ K =
−
b∈A
(pk2b + ck2b xk2b )+ uk2

1−
−
b∈A
xk2b

in the latter, i.e., the cost structure is identical for commodities k1 and k2, thus can be reduced to a single commodity problem.
It can be proved that the polyhedron P is full dimensional and that most of the constraints in our formulation induce
facets of the convex hull of feasible solutions, under mild conditions. For the sake of completeness, these results, whose
proofs can be found in [16], are listed below.
Proposition 4. The polyhedron P has full dimension, i.e., Dim(P ) = 5n.
Proposition 5. The constraint
∑
b∈A x
k2
b ≤ 1 defines a facet of P if and only if, for each b ∈ A such that Mk1b > Mk2b , there
exists d ∈ A \ {b} such that Mk1d ≤ Mk2d and ck2d − ck1d ≠ ck2b − ck1b .
Proposition 6. The constraint pk2a˜ ≤ Mk2a˜ xk2a˜ defines a facet of P if and only if either Mk2a˜ < Mk1a˜ or there exists b ∈ A \ {a˜}
such that (a˜, k1) ∼ (b, k2).
Proposition 7. The constraint ta˜ − pk2a˜ ≤ Na˜(1 − xk2a˜ ) defines a facet of P if and only if either Mk1a˜ < Mk2a˜ or there exists
b ∈ A \ {a˜} such that (b, k1) ∼ (a˜, k2).
Proposition 8. Constraints (13) are never facet defining for P .
Proposition 9. The constraint pk2a˜ ≥ 0 defines a facet of P if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) Mk2a˜ < M
k1
a˜ .
(ii) Mk2a˜ > M
k1
a˜ and there exists b ∈ A \ {a˜} such that (a˜, k1) ∼ (b, k2).
(iii) Mk2a˜ = Mk1a˜ and either there exists b ∈ A \ {a˜} such that (a˜, k1) ∼ (b, k2), or there exists b ∈ A \ {a˜}, v ∈ R such that
(b, k1) ∼ (a˜, k2), 0 ≤ v ≤ Mk1b and ck2a˜ − ck2b ≤ v ≤ ck1a˜ − ck1b .
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One can also show that most inequalities introduced in Section 3 define facets of P . To prove such results, let
(t; pk1; pk2; xk1; xk2) ∈ P and H the hyperplane induced by a given inequality. We need to show that H is the sole
hyperplane that contains P ∩H .
LetH = {(t; p; x) : µt + νk1pk1 + νk2pk2 + ξ k1xk1 + ξ k2xk2 = 0} and assume that all points of P ∩H lie on a generic
hyperplane G = {(t; p; x) : αt+ βk1pk1 + βk2pk2 + γ k1xk1 + γ k2xk2 = δ}. The following lemmas relate the coefficients of
H and G.
Lemma 3. Let P ∩H ⊆ G. We have:
(i) If µ = 0, then α = 0 and δ = 0.
(ii) If (i) holds, then γ k1b = −γ k2b for all b ∈ A such that ξ k1b = −ξ k2b .
(iii) If (i) and (ii) hold, then βk1b = −βk2b for all b ∈ A such that νk1b = −νk2b .
Proof. If µ = 0, then (∑a∈A Naea; 0; 0; 0; 0) and (∑a∈A Naea − ϵeb; 0; 0; 0; 0) belong to P ∩ H for all b ∈ A. As these
points also belong to the generic hyperplane G, it follows that−
a∈A
Naαa = δ−
a∈A
Naαa − ϵαb = δ,
thus α = 0 and δ = 0. Further, for any b ∈ A with ξ k1b = −ξ k2b , the point (
∑
a∈A\{b} Naea; 0; 0; eb; eb) belongs to P ∩H ,
and one obtains γ k1b + γ k2b = 0.
Next, if νk1b = −νk2b , then (
∑
a∈A\{b} Naea + ϵeb; ϵeb; ϵeb; eb; eb) also belongs to P ∩H , which yields βk1b = −βk2b . 
Lemma 4. Let G be a hyperplane containing P ∩ H and Mk1b < Mk2b for some b ∈ A. If µ = 0 and νk2b = 0 = ξ k2b , then
β
k2
b = 0 = γ k2b .
Proof. The points −
a∈A\{b}
Naea +Mk1b eb; 0;Mk1b eb; 0; eb

 −
a∈A\{b}
Naea + (Mk1b + ϵ)eb; 0; (Mk1b + ϵ)eb; 0; eb

belong to P ∩H . By Lemma 3, one obtains α = 0 and δ = 0, hence
Mk1b β
k2
b + γ k2b = 0
(Mk1b + ϵ)βk2b + γ k2b = 0,
and βk2b = 0 = γ k2b . 
Lemma 5. Let G be a hyperplane containing P ∩H , and b, d ∈ A be such that ck2d − ck1d ≤ ck2b − ck1b and Mk1d ≤ Mk2d (resp.
Mk1d ≥ Mk2d ).
(i) If µ = 0, ξ k1b = −ξ k2d and νk1b = νk2d = 0, then βk1b = −βk2d and (Mk1b − Mk1d )βk1b + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0 (resp.
(Mk2b −Mk2d )βk1b + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0).
(ii) Further, if ck2d − ck1d < ck2b − ck1b , then βk1b = 0 = βk2d and γ k1b = −γ k2d .
Proof. IfMk1d ≤ Mk2d , the points −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea +Mk1b eb +Mk1d ed;Mk1b eb;Mk1d ed; eb; ed

 −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (Mk1b − ϵ)eb + (Mk1d − ϵ)ed; (Mk1b − ϵ)eb; (Mk1d − ϵ)ed; eb; ed

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belong to P ∩H . IfMk1d ≥ Mk2d , the points −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea +Mk2b eb +Mk2d ed;Mk2b eb;Mk2d ed; eb; ed

 −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (Mk2b − ϵ)eb + (Mk2d − ϵ)ed; (Mk2b − ϵ)eb; (Mk2d − ϵ)ed; eb; ed

belong to P ∩H . IfMk1d ≤ Mk2d (the caseMk1d ≥ Mk2d is similar), Lemma 3 implies that α = 0 and δ = 0, and one obtains
Mk1b β
k1
b +Mk1d βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0
(Mk1b − ϵ)βk1b + (Mk1d − ϵ)βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0,
thus βk1b = −βk2d and (Mk1b −Mk1d )βk1b + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0. Further, if ck2d − ck1d < ck2b − ck1b , the point −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (Mk1b − ϵ)eb +Mk1d ed; (Mk1b − ϵ)eb;Mk1d ed; eb; ed

or  −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (Mk2b + ϵ)eb +Mk2d ed; (Mk2b + ϵ)eb;Mk2d ed; eb; ed

is in P ∩ H (for Mk1d ≤ Mk2d or Mk1d > Mk2d respectively). If we assume Mk1d ≤ Mk2d (the case Mk1d ≥ Mk2d is similar), one
obtains
(Mk1b −Mk1d − ϵ)βk1b + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0,
thus βk1b = 0 = βk2d and γ k1b = −γ k2d . 
Lemma 6. Let G be a hyperplane containing P ∩ H and let b ∈ A be such that Mk1b ≤ Mk2b . If µ = 0 and ξ k2b = −Mk2b νk2b ,
then γ k2b = −Mk2b βk2b .
Proof. The point (
∑
a∈A\{b} Naea +Mk2b eb; 0;Mk2b eb; 0; eb) belongs to P ∩H . As µ = 0, we have that α = 0 and δ = 0 by
Lemma 3. It follows that γ k2b = −Mk2b βk2b . 
Lemma 7. Let G be a hyperplane containing P ∩H and let b ∈ A such that Mk1b > Mk2b . If the coefficients of H are such that
µ = 0, ξ k1b = −Mk2b νk1b and ξ k2b = −Mk2b νk2b , then γ k1b = −Mk2b βk1b and γ k2b = −Mk2b βk2b .
Proof. As previously, we have that α = 0 and δ = 0 by Lemma 3. Since the points −
a∈A\{b}
Naea +Mk2b eb;Mk2b eb; 0; eb; 0

 −
a∈A\{b}
Naea +Mk2b eb;Mk2b eb;Mk2b eb; eb; eb

,
belong to P ∩H , one obtains
Mk2b β
k1
b + γ k1b = 0
Mk2b β
k1
b +Mk2b βk2b + γ k1b + γ k2b = 0.
The result follows. 
Based on the previous lemmas, we are in position to prove that most SSP and SPUB inequalities presented in Section 3
define facets of P .
Proposition 10. If Mk1b < M
k2
b for all b ∈ S ⊆ A, then the SSP inequalities (23) define facets of P .
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Proof. First note that inequality (23) can be rewritten as−
b∈A
(pk1b −Mk1b xk1b )−
−
b∈A\S
(pk2b −Mk1b xk2b ) ≤ 0.
Let H = {(t; p; x) : ∑b∈A(pk1b − Mk1b xk1b ) −∑b∈A\S(pk2b − Mk1b xk2b ) = 0}. We have that α = 0 and δ = 0 by Lemma 3.
Further, for any b ∈ S, and provided thatMk1b < Mk2b , one obtains βk2b = 0 = γ k2b by Lemma 4. For all b ∈ A \ S, Lemma 3
yields βk1b = −βk2b and γ k1b = −γ k2b .
Next, for all b ∈ A such thatMk1b ≥ Mk2b (resp.Mk1b < Mk2b ), switching the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 6 (resp.
Lemma 7) yields γ k1b = −Mk1b βk1b . Now, if there exist d ∈ A \ S, b ∈ A such that (b, k1) ∼ (d, k2) and ck1b < ck1d , the points −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (ck1d − ck1b )eb; (ck1d − ck1b )eb; 0; eb; ed

 −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (ck1d − ck1b + ϵ)eb + ϵed; (ck1d − ck1b + ϵ)eb; ϵed; eb; ed

also belong to P ∩H . This yields βk1b = −βk2d . On the other hand, if ck1b ≥ ck1d , the points −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (ck1b − ck1d )ed; 0; (ck1b − ck1d )ed; eb; ed

 −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + ϵeb + (ck1b − ck1d + ϵ)ed; ϵeb; (ck1b − ck1d + ϵ)ed; eb; eb

belong to P ∩H . Hence one obtains βk1b = −βk2d for all b ∈ A and d ∈ A \ S. 
The SSP inequalities (22) can also define facets of P . However, since this only occurs under restrictive conditions, it will
not be mentioned any further in this paper. Next, we turn our attention to the SPUB inequalities.
Proposition 11. Under the assumption that, for all b ∈ A>a such that Mk1b = Mk2b , there exists d ∈ A>a such that ck2b − ck1b ≠
ck2d − ck1d , the SPUB inequalities (24) define facets of P .
Proof. Let a˜ ∈ A and
H =
(t; p; x) : pk2a˜ −Mk2a˜ xk2a˜ − (Mk2a˜ −Mk1a˜ )
 −
b∈A<a˜ \{a˜}
(xk2b − xk1b )− xk1a˜
 = 0
 .
By Lemma 3, α = 0 and δ = 0, and βk1b = −βk2b , γ k1b = −γ k2b for all b ∈ A \ {a˜}. Further, for all b ∈ A>a˜ such that
Mk1b < M
k2
b , Lemma 4 yields β
k2
b = 0 = γ k2b . If Mk2b < Mk1b , switching the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 4 yields
β
k1
b = 0 = γ k1b . Hence βk1b = 0 = βk2b and γ k1b = γ k2b = 0 for all b ∈ A>a˜ such thatMk1b ≠ Mk2b .
For all b ∈ A>a˜ such that Mk1b = Mk2b , there exists d ∈ A \ {b} such that ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d by Assumption 2. Then,
provided there exists such a toll arc d inA>a˜ , one obtains β
k1
b = βk2b = 0 by Lemma 5, thus also γ k2b = 0 = γ k1b by Lemma 6.
Next, for all b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, recall that, by assumption, one has ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2a˜ − ck1a˜ . Hence, setting b = a˜ and d = b in
Lemma 5 yields βk1a˜ = 0 = βk2b = βk1b and γ k1a˜ = −γ k2b .
Finally, setting b = a˜ in Lemma 6 yields γ k2a˜ = −Mk2a˜ βk2a˜ . As the point −
a∈A\{a˜}
Naea +Mk1a˜ ea˜;Mk1a˜ ea˜;Mk1a˜ ea˜; ea˜; ea˜

also belongs to P ∩H , one obtains γ k1a˜ = (Mk2a˜ −Mk1a˜ )βk2a˜ and the result follows. 
Note that the conditions imposed in the previous proposition imply that eitherMk1b ≠ Mk2b for all b ∈ A>a˜ or there exist
at least two toll arcs b, d ∈ A>a˜ such that ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d . The proof of the next result is deferred to the Appendix.
Proposition 12. If, for all b ∈ A>a˜ such that Mk1b ≤ Mk2b (resp. Mk1b > Mk2b ), there exists d ∈ A>a˜ \ {b} such that Mk1d ≤ Mk2d
(resp. Mk1d > M
k2
d ) and c
k2
b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d , then the SPUB inequalities (25) define facets of P .
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Next, we address the case of the SPUB inequalities (26) and (27).
Proposition 13. If the following conditions hold:
(i) for all b ∈ A>a˜ such that Mk1b = Mk2b , there exists d ∈ A>a˜ \ {b} such that ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d ;
(ii) for all b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, there exists d ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜} such that ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d ;
(iii) there exists b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, v ∈ R such that ck1a˜ − ck1b ≤ v ≤ ck2a˜ − ck2b and 0 ≤ v ≤ Mk2b ,
then the SPUB inequalities (26) define facets of P .
Proof. Let H = {(t; p; x) : pk2a˜ − pk1a˜ − Mk2a˜
∑
b∈A<a˜ (x
k2
b − xk1b ) = 0}. Lemma 3 yields α = 0, δ = 0, βk1b = −βk2b and
γ
k1
b = −γ k2b for all b ∈ A.
For any b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, the assumptions ensure that there exists d ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}with ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d . Without loss of
generality, let us assume that ck2d − ck1d < ck2b − ck1b . One can check thatMk1d ≤ Mk2d for all d ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, which implies, by
Lemma 5, that βk1b = βk2d = 0 and γ k1b = −γ k2d for all b, d ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}.
Now, for all b ∈ A>a˜ such thatMk1b < Mk2b , Lemma 4 yields βk2b = γ k2b = 0. IfMk2b < Mk1b , one obtains βk1b = γ k1b = 0 by
switching the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 4. Hence β
k1
b = βk2b = 0 and γ k1b = γ k2b = 0 for all b ∈ A>a˜ such that
Mk1b ≠ Mk2b .
On the other hand, for all b ∈ A>a˜ such that Mk1b = Mk2b , there exists d ∈ A \ {b} such that ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d by
Assumption 2. Then, provided there exists such a toll arc d inA>a˜ , one obtainsβ
k1
b = βk2b = 0 by Lemma5 and γ k2b = γ k1b = 0
by Lemma 6.
Next, provided there exists b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, v ∈ R such that ck1a˜ − ck1b ≤ v ≤ ck2a˜ − ck2b and 0 ≤ v ≤ Mk2b , the point −
a∈A\{b,a˜}
Naea + veb; 0; veb; ea˜; eb

belongs to P ∩H . One can verify that the existence of v ∈ R is required since xk1a˜ = xk2b = 1 (with b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}) implies
that pk1a˜ = 0 for points inH . Hence γ k2b = −γ k1a˜ for all b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}.
Finally, setting b = a˜ in Lemma 6 yields γ k2a˜ = −Mk2a˜ βk2a˜ . As γ k1b = −γ k2b for all b ∈ A, one obtains γ k2b = −Mk2a˜ βk2a˜ =
−γ k1b for all b ∈ A, and the result follows. 
The final result, whose proof is detailed in the Appendix, is stated as follows.
Proposition 14. If the following conditions hold:
(i) for all b ∈ A>a˜ such that Mk1b ≤ Mk2b (resp. Mk1b > Mk2b ), there exists d ∈ A>a˜ \ {b} such that Mk1d ≤ Mk2d (resp. Mk1d > Mk2d )
and ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d ;
(ii) for all b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, there exists d ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜} such that ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d ;
(iii) there exists b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, v ∈ R such that ck1a˜ − ck1b ≤ v ≤ ck2a˜ − ck2b and 0 ≤ v ≤ Mk2b ,
then the SPUB inequalities (27) define facets of P .
Note that the conditions imposed so that inequalities (26)–(27) define facets of P are similar to the ones imposed for
inequalities (24)–(25). Since most inequalities considered define facets of the two-commodity case, we can expect that they
provide deep cuts for the general case, and help in the numerical solution of the Clique Pricing Problem. This will be the
topic of the remainder of this work.
5. A branch-and-cut implementation
In this section, we show that the SSP and SPUB inequalities introduced previously are not only tight for two-commodity
problems, but are also efficient, from an algorithmic point of view, for both the Clique Pricing Problem and an interesting
variant thereof.
5.1. Problem generation
In order to test our valid inequalities, we generated scenarios built around the topology of Highway 10 in Québec
(Canada). These involve a complete network based on 5 to 10 cities and 10 to 15 entry–exit nodes on the highway, i.e., 20
to 90 commodities and 90 to 210 toll arcs. For each scenario, replicated 5 times, demands for city pairs were set to random
values between 10 and 100.
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Table 1
Number of feasible paths per commodity. Each entry shows
the number of cities and highway nodes, respectively.
Size Min Max µ σ
(5, 10) 1 64 22.6 17.3
(5, 12) 1 69 29.7 19.0
(5, 15) 1 140 41.9 27.1
(8, 10) 1 63 17.6 15.9
(8, 12) 1 92 28.3 21.2
Now let h(a) and t(a) denote the head and tail of a ∈ A, respectively. For each a ∈ A, the following set is also defined:
Ca = {b ∈ A : t(a) ≤ t(b) ≤ h(b) ≤ h(a) or t(a) ≥ t(b) ≥ h(b) ≥ h(a)}. (28)
In order to set fixed costs on paths, fixed costs on all arcs of the network are generated randomly as explained further.
Fixed costs on toll arcs a ∈ A such that h(a) = t(a) + 1 are first randomly generated between 20 and 70. Then fixed costs
on toll arcs b ∈ A such that h(b) = t(b) + l, l > 1 are set to the sum of fixed costs of all toll arcs a ∈ Cb such that
h(a) = t(a) + 1. We also set cb = ca for all a, b ∈ A : h(b) = t(a), t(b) = h(a). Next, fixed costs on toll free arcs linking
cities and highway nodes are generated as follows. First, the closest highway node i ∈ N from a given city v is selected
randomly, and the fixed cost on the corresponding arc a ∈ A is randomly generated between 2 and 70. The fixed costs
on the toll free arcs b ∈ A : t(b) = t(a), h(a) − 2 ≤ h(b) ≤ h(a) + 2 (i.e., the toll free arcs linking the given city v
and the four closest nodes from i) are randomly generated between 15 and 120. Finally, the fixed costs on the toll free arcs
b ∈ A : t(b) = t(a), h(b) < h(a) − 2 or h(b) > h(a) + 2 are randomly generated between 30 and 1000. The fixed costs
between cities are randomly generated between 150 and 1000. Note that these are computed so that the cost from a city v1
to a city v2 is equal to the cost from v2 to v1. Assuming that a road beside the highway is slower, the fixed costs on toll free
arcs are multiplied by a 1.5 factor.
For a network with n nodes, each commodity initially contains n(n − 1) paths. However, for any commodity k ∈ K ,
toll arcs a ∈ A such that cka > uk are clearly irrelevant, and are removed from the network. Hence, in the data instances,
each commodity is linked to the corresponding set of feasible paths, which allows us to deal with smaller networks. Table 1
provides the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation of the number of feasible paths for each commodity in
the generated instances.
5.2. Implementation
Computational experiments were performed under scenarios involving the valid inequalities introduced in this work.
Both families of cuts were only computed at the root node of the branch-and-cut tree, and appended to themodel whenever
they were violated. Indeed, preliminary results (see [16]) indicate that appending the violated valid cuts at all nodes of
the branch-and-cut tree increases the CPU times without any other significant improvement. At each iteration of the root
node, violation tests were conducted, and the number of SSP inequalities appended was limited to half the number of
commodities. Furthermore, the SSP inequalities were separated using the polynomial algorithm described in Section 3. The
SPUB inequalities, polynomial in number, were directly appended to model CP . Finally, we set a computational time upper
bound of 5 h (18,000 s), after which the solution process was halted.
In order to assess the efficiency of the valid inequalities, the related number of nodes, CPU times and the gap (in
percentage) between the linear relaxation optimal solution Zlp and the true optimal solution Zopt , defined as
gap = 100× Zlp − Zopt
Zopt
,
are reported. Note that Zlp is computed after appending the valid inequalities, at the root of the branch-and-cut algorithm.
The models were implemented under Mosel of Xpress-MP, Optimizer version 18. All automated pre-processing features
were switched on, although Xpress’ automated heuristics were switched off, being unable to handle our manual cuts. All
other Xpress-MP parameter settings were default ones, which means that Xpress-MP automatically selects the variables
and nodes during the branch-and-cut algorithm. Numerical experiments were carried out on a Pentium 4.3 GHz processor
equipped with 2 Gb of RAM and running under Linux Kernel version 2.6.4.
5.3. Numerical results for the Clique Pricing Problem
In this section, we assess the influence of the valid inequalities when integrated within a branch-and-cut scheme. The
results are displayed in Tables 2–5. For the instances that could be solved to optimality within the allotted CPU time, we
observe a sharp decrease in both the gap and number of nodes, when the SSP inequalities were incorporated. For all but
the smallest instances, we also observed a sharp drop in the CPU time. However, merging both classes of valid inequalities
(i.e., SSP and SPUB) did not yield a significant improvement in any of the performance measures. The typical evolution of
the objective’s lower and upper bounds is illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3.
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Table 2
The base model CP . The symbols µ and σ denote the average and standard deviation with respect to
the instances solved to optimality, while ‘nodes’ refers to the number of nodes in the branch-and-bound
process. Leftmost numbers (between stars) provide the number of instances that could not be solved to
proven optimality within the time limit.
Size Gap Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(5, 10) 11.85 7.03 20 31 1893 3315
(5, 12) 16.82 5.83 188 283 4067 4899
(5, 15) 13.10 3.68 405 497 9797 12446
∗2∗ (8, 10) 15.98 6.98 3520 4934 159,015 222,837
∗2∗ (8, 12) 19.19 4.6 5272 7004 147,793 200,928
Table 3
Appending the SSP inequalities (22)–(23).
Size Gap Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(5, 10) 1.52 1.45 21 25 388 683
(5, 12) 1.84 2.09 52 64 103 84
(5, 15) 1.86 1.54 241 256 719 591
∗2∗ (8, 10) 3.56 1.96 3038 4262 9722 13,173
∗2∗ (8, 12) 1.59 1.48 1313 1454 3974 5350
Table 4
Appending the SPUB inequalities (24)–(25) and (26)–(27).
Size Gap Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(5, 10) 10.75 7.05 40 64 3150 5935
(5, 12) 15.00 4.82 222 282 12,410 14,762
(5, 15) 12.09 3.77 1050 1809 23,965 41,766
∗1∗ (8, 10) 17.01 7.47 3430 3452 93,890 100,592
∗3∗ (8, 12) 13.86 1.37 1128 41 31,276 8104
Table 5
Appending the SSP inequalities (22)–(23) and the SPUB inequalities (24)–(25) and (26)–(27).
Size Gap Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(5, 10) 1.50 1.44 18 21 342 603
(5, 12) 1.84 2.09 57 67 114 100
(5, 15) 1.83 1.54 249 249 1112 1313
∗2∗ (8, 10) 3.41 1.95 1959 2728 5845 7692
∗2∗ (8, 12) 1.55 1.47 1582 1938 4011 5584
Table 6
Model SHPP with inequalities (19)–(21).
Size Gap Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(5, 10) 18.75 6.79 3134 5880 289,522 553,763
∗1∗ (5, 12) 19.35 11.74 1796 2663 98,679 146,442
∗2∗ (5, 15) 16.57 1.77 514 509 21,763 17,504
∗4∗ (8, 10) 10.53 0 114.23 0 5662 0
∗5∗ (8, 12) * * * * * *
Next, we compare the efficiency of our formulationwith that of Shioda et al.’s SHPP , under valid inequalities (19)–(21).
We base our tests on the randomly generated instances described in Section 5.1. Inequalities (19) and (20) are appended to
the initialmodel, while inequalities (21) are generated at the root of the branch-and-cut tree but only appended to themodel
when violated. The results obtained are presented in Table 6. Comparing Tables 2–5 to Table 6, we observe that model CP
with or even without the valid inequalities clearly outperforms Shioda et al.’s formulation. This confirms that constraints
(16) of SHPP are weaker, both theoretically and numerically, than constraints (10).
It is worth noting that Shioda et al.’s studywas concernedwith a product pricing problemunrelated to a specific network.
For the sake of fairness, we now present numerical results obtained on a set of product pricing problems, generated as
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the objective function value with respect to the CPU time (in seconds) for an instance of class (8, 10). The lower and upper bound
values for the initial model CP are denoted by ‘LB’ and ‘UB’, while the lower and upper bound values for model CP with both classes of valid inequalities
are denoted by ‘LB Final’ and ‘UB Final’, respectively.
Fig. 3. Evolution of the objective function value with respect to the CPU time (in seconds) for an instance of class (8, 12).
Table 7
Model SHPP with inequalities (19)–(21), tested on Shioda et al. instances. Size is measured with
respect to number of commodities (purchaser segments) and number of toll arcs (products). Each
row corresponds to 5 instances of a given size.
Size Gap (%) Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
∗5∗ (40, 20) * * * * * *
∗1∗ (40, 40) 0.67 0.14 3657 3315 59,420 46,890
(40, 60) 0.33 0.07 658 744 3077 4183
∗5∗ (60, 20) * * * * * *
∗5∗ (60, 40) * * * * * *
∗5∗ (60, 60) * * * * * *
described in [4]. Precisely, we consider a number of purchaser segments (‘commodities’ in the network model) and a
number of products (‘toll arcs’), randomly generated within the intervals [40, 80] and [10, 60], respectively. Each customer
k is associated with a random demand ηk ∈ [500, 799] and a reservation price rka ∈ [512, 1023] for product a, the latter
corresponding to shortest toll free arcs in the networkmodel. The results are displayed in Tables 7 and8,where the behaviour
observed earlier becomes even more pronounced.
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Table 8
Model CP with inequalities (22)–(23), (24)–(25) and (26)–(27), tested on Shioda et al. instances.
Size Gap (%) Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(40, 20) 0.57 0.26 94 69 975 1419
(40, 40) 0.11 0.06 103 40 107 127
(40, 60) 0.04 0.02 185 48 18 15
∗1∗ (60, 20) 0.52 0.34 3456 3449 17,585 15,701
∗1∗ (60, 40) 0.16 0.1 539 295 2561 2557
(60, 60) 0.09 0.07 1687 1954 3811 6818
Fig. 4. Subnetworks on which triangle and monotonicity inequalities apply.
Table 9
Number of feasible paths per commodity.
Size Min Max µ σ
(5, 10) 1 20 17.3 24.2
(5, 12) 1 24 10.9 24.2
(5, 15) 1 35 12.9 53.1
(8, 10) 1 20 7.4 25.6
(8, 12) 1 24 10.5 37.1
(8, 15) 1 35 13.2 66.1
5.4. A variant of the Clique Pricing Problem
In the original formulation of the Clique Pricing Problem, an optimal solution might be such that the sum of the tolls on
consecutive arcs between two nodes i and j is less than the toll on the direct arc from i to j. Similarly to Dewez [15] and
Heilporn et al. [11], we impose triangle inequalities
ta ≤ tb + tc ∀a, b, c ∈ A : t(a) = t(b), h(b) = t(c), h(c) = h(a), (29)
where h(a) and t(a) denote the head and tail of a ∈ A, respectively. We also introduce monotonicity inequalities that
specify that the toll on a path cannot be less than the toll on any subpath, i.e., the inequality ta ≥ tb holds for any pair of arcs
(a, b) ∈ A×A such that one of the following four conditions involving their indices holds:
(i) t(a) = t(b) < h(a) = h(b)+ 1
(ii) t(a) = t(b)− 1 < h(a) = h(b)
(iii) t(a) = t(b) > h(a) = h(b)− 1
(iv) t(a) = t(b)+ 1 > h(a) = h(b).
Subnetworks on which these inequalities apply are illustrated in Fig. 4.
The model involving triangle and monotonicity constraints is labelled CP ∗. Note that constants Na : a ∈ A that appear
in constraints (12) can now be set to Na = N = maxk,a{Mka } for all a ∈ A.
Triangle and monotonicity constraints are generated at every node of the branch-and-cut algorithm and appended to
model CP ∗ when violated. We impose an upper bound on the number of constraints appended at a single iteration of the
branch-and-cut algorithm. For a given commodity, this bound is set to half the maximal number of feasible paths for the
triangle constraints, and to twice that number for themonotonicity constraints. Random instanceswere generated according
to the rules set in Section 5.1. Based on monotonicity constraints, a variable xka (a ∈ A, k ∈ K) was set to zero whenever
there exists an arc b such that ckb < c
k
a and b lies in between t(a) and h(a). This allows one to significantly reduce the number
of admissible paths. Table 9 provides theminimum,maximum,mean and standard deviation of the number of feasible paths
per commodity.
The numerical results, displayed in Tables 10–12, again indicate that, while the SPUB constraints slightly improve the
gap, the number of nodes explored and the overall CPU time does not decrease significantly.
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Table 10
Model CP ∗ .
Size Gap (%) Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(5, 10) 18.10 7.22 2 1 184 151
(5, 12) 20.13 6.03 18 25 1131 1692
(5, 15) 19.52 4.82 5 3 407 368
(8, 10) 30.09 8.42 262 425 27,991 47,056
(8, 12) 32.04 8.28 947 1118 263,875 348,671
∗4∗ (8, 15) 36.94 0 3571 0 202,361 0
Table 11
Model CP ∗ with SSP inequalities (22)–(23).
Size Gap (%) Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(5, 10) 6.53 4.47 4 2 69 39
(5, 12) 3.98 3.06 10 9 127 140
(5, 15) 4.55 3.18 8 6 101 85
(8, 10) 12.64 5.05 682 1004 9205 15,224
∗1∗ (8, 12) 9.96 5.55 1099 1249 23,473 23,453
∗4∗ (8, 15) 16.28 0 5796 0 102,359 0
Table 12
Model CP ∗ with SSP and SPUB inequalities (22)–(23), (24)–(25) and (26)–(27).
Size Gap (%) Time (s) Nodes
µ σ µ σ µ σ
(5, 10) 6.47 4.53 6 4 88 70
(5, 12) 3.97 3.06 7 6 138 113
(5, 15) 4.46 3.14 11 7 106 75
(8, 10) 12.29 5.19 1195 1981 14,625 24,737
∗1∗ (8, 12) 9.79 5.53 1713 2515 27,777 38,116
∗4∗ (8, 15) 16.26 0 2918 0 71,731 0
Fig. 5. Evolution of the objective function valuewith respect to the CPU time (in seconds) for an instance of class (8, 10). The lower and upper bound values
for the initial model CP ∗ are denoted by ‘LB’ and ‘UB’, while the lower and upper bound values for model CP ∗ with inequalities (22)–(23) are denoted by
‘LB Final’ and ‘UB Final’, respectively.
We conclude that the best valid inequalities for this variant of the Clique Pricing Problem are still the SSP inequalities
(22)–(23), as they provide a significant decrease of the gap and number of nodes in the branch-and-cut algorithm, at the
expense of increasing the CPU time. To illustrate the results, Figs. 5 and 6 depict the evolution of the lower and upper bounds
on the objective function with respect to the CPU time for two specific instances.
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Fig. 6. Evolution of the objective function value with respect to the CPU time (in seconds) for an instance of class (8, 12).
6. Conclusion
Together with its companion paper [11], the present work constitutes the first systematic study of the polyhedral
properties of network pricing, or its equivalent in economics. In particular, we showed that a class of theoretically strong
inequalities performed well numerically. As a follow-up, it would be interesting to investigate the polyhedral structure of
a problem involving fixed costs on the toll arcs of the associated network design and pricing problem (see [19]) akin to
‘product line design’ in the economics literature [2].
Appendix. Proofs of Propositions 12 and 14
The proofs require the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Assume that P ∩H is a subset of a generic hyperplane G, and let b, d ∈ A such that ck2d − ck1d < ck2b − ck1b . If the
coefficients of H are such that µ = 0, ξ k1b = −ξ k2d and νk1b = 0 = νk2d , then βk1b = 0 andmin{Mk1d ,Mk2d }βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0.
Proof. IfMk1d ≤ Mk2d , the points −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea +Mk1b eb +Mk1d ed;Mk1b eb;Mk1d ed; eb; ed

 −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (Mk1b − ϵ)eb +Mk1d ed; (Mk1b − ϵ)eb;Mk1d ed; eb; ed

are in P ∩H . Otherwise, i.e., ifMk1d > Mk2d , the points −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea +Mk2b eb +Mk2d ed;Mk2b eb;Mk2d ed; eb; ed

 −
a∈A\{b,d}
Naea + (Mk2b + ϵ)eb +Mk2d ed; (Mk2b + ϵ)eb;Mk2d ed; eb; ed

are in P ∩H .
First, one knows that µ = 0 implies α = 0 and δ = 0 by Lemma 3. Then, ifMk1d ≤ Mk2d , one obtains
Mk1b β
k1
b +Mk1d βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0
(Mk1b − ϵ)βk1b +Mk1d βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0,
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thus βk1b = 0 andMk1d βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0. Otherwise, i.e., ifMk1d > Mk2d , one obtains
Mk2b β
k1
b +Mk2d βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0
(Mk2b + ϵ)βk1b +Mk2d βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0,
thus βk1b = 0 andMk2d βk2d + γ k1b + γ k2d = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 12. Let H = {(t; p; x) : pk2a˜ − Mk2a˜ xk2a˜ − (Mk2a˜ − Mk1a˜ )(
∑
b∈A<a˜ \{a˜}(x
k2
b − xk1b ) − xk1a˜ ) − (Mk2b∗ −
Mk1b∗ )
∑
b∈A>a :Mk2b ≥M
k1
b
(xk2b − xk1b ) = 0}.
First of all, Lemma 3 yields α = 0, δ = 0 and βk1b = −βk2b , γ k1b = −γ k2b for all b ∈ A \ {a˜}. Further, for any b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜},
setting b = a˜ and d = b in Lemma 5 yields βk2b = −βk1a˜ , thus also βk1b = −βk1a˜ .
For all d ∈ A>a˜ such thatMk1d ≤ Mk2d (resp.Mk1d > Mk2d ), the proposition hypothesis ensures that there exists b ∈ A>a˜ \{d}
such that Mk1b ≤ Mk2b (resp. Mk1d > Mk2d ) and ck2d − ck1d ≠ ck2b − ck1b . Without loss of generality, let us assume that
ck2d − ck1d < ck2b − ck1b . As Lemma 5 yields βk1b = −βk2d , it follows that βk1b = 0 = βk2b for all b, d ∈ A>a˜ by Lemma 8.
Now, for all b ∈ A>a˜ such thatMk1b > Mk2b , switching the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 6 yields γ k1b = −Mk1b βk1b .
As βk1b = 0, one obtains γ k1b = 0, thus also γ k2b = 0.
Next, for all b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, recall that there does not exist any b ∈ \{a˜} such that ck2b − ck1b = ck2a˜ − ck1a˜ by hypothesis.
Hence, setting b = a˜ and d = b in Lemma 8 yields βk1a˜ = 0 andMk1b βk2b + γ k1a˜ + γ k2b = 0. As βk2b = −βk1a˜ = −βk1b , it follows
that βk2b = 0 = βk1b for all b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}. One also obtains γ k2b = −γ k1a˜ .
Next, setting b = a˜ in Lemma 6 yields γ k2a˜ = −Mk2a˜ βk2a˜ . As the point −
a∈A\{a˜}
Naea +Mk1a˜ ea˜;Mk1a˜ ea˜;Mk1a˜ ea˜; ea˜; ea˜

also belongs to P ∩H , it follows that γ k1a˜ = (Mk2a˜ −Mk1a˜ )βk2a˜ .
Finally, for all b ∈ A>a˜ such thatMk1b ≤ Mk2b , the points −
a∈A\{a˜,b}
Naea + (Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2a˜ )ea˜ + (Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2b )eb; (Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2b )eb; (Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2a˜ )ea˜; eb; ea˜

are in P ∩H since x1b = 1 = xk2a˜ (b ∈ A>a˜ : Mk1b ≤ Mk2b ) implies pk2a˜ = Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2a˜ for points ofH , which yields
(Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2a˜ )βk2a˜ + γ k1b + γ k2a˜ = 0.
As γ k2a˜ = −Mk2a˜ βk2a˜ , one obtains γ k1b = (Mk2b∗ −Mk1b∗ )βk2a˜ and the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 14. LetH = {(t; p; x) : pk2a˜ − pk1a˜ −Mk2a˜
∑
b∈A<a˜ (x
k2
b − xk1b )− (Mk2b∗ −Mk1b∗ )
∑
b∈A>a˜ :M
k2
b ≥M
k1
b
(xk2b − xk1b )
= 0}.
Lemma 3 yields α = 0, δ = 0, βk1b = −βk2b and γ k1b = −γ k2b for all b ∈ A. Next, for any b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, there exists
d ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜} such that ck2b − ck1b ≠ ck2d − ck1d by the proposition hypothesis. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
ck2d − ck1d < ck2b − ck1b . AsMk1d ≤ Mk2d for all d ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, Lemmas 5 and 8 yield βk1b = −βk2d and βk1b = 0 respectively. Hence
β
k1
b = 0 = βk2b for all b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}.
For all d ∈ A>a˜ such thatMk1d ≤ Mk2d (resp.Mk1d > Mk2d ), the proposition hypothesis ensures that there exists b ∈ A>a˜ \{d}
such that Mk1b ≤ Mk2b (resp. Mk1d > Mk2d ) and ck2d − ck1d ≠ ck2b − ck1b . Without loss of generality, let us assume that
ck2d − ck1d < ck2b − ck1b . As Lemma 5 yields βk1b = −βk2d , it follows that βk1b = 0 = βk2b for all b, d ∈ A>a˜ by Lemma 8.
Further, for all b ∈ A>a˜ such thatMk1b > Mk2b , switching the commodity indices k1 and k2 in Lemma 6 yields γ k1b = −Mk1b βk1b .
As βk1b = 0, one obtains γ k1b = 0, thus also γ k2b = 0.
Next, provided there exists b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}, v ∈ R such that ck1a˜ − ck1b ≤ v ≤ ck2a˜ − ck2b and 0 ≤ v ≤ Mk2b , the point −
a∈A\{b,a˜}
Naea + veb; 0; veb; ea˜; eb

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is in P ∩H . Note that the existence of v ∈ R is required since xk1a˜ = 1 = xk2b (b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}) implies that pk1a˜ = 0 for points
ofH . This yields γ k2b = −γ k1a˜ for all b ∈ A<a˜ \ {a˜}. Setting b = a˜ in Lemma 6 yields γ k2a˜ = −Mk2a˜ βk2a˜ . As γ k1b = −γ k2b for all
b ∈ A, one obtains γ k2b = Mk2a˜ βk2a˜ = −γ k1b for all b ∈ A.
Finally, for all b ∈ A>a˜ such thatMk1b ≤ Mk2b , the points −
a∈A\{a˜,b}
Naea + (Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2a˜ )ea˜ + (Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2b )eb; (Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2b )eb; (Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2a˜ )ea˜; eb; ea˜

are in P ∩H since x1b = 1 = xk2a˜ (b ∈ A>a˜ : Mk1b ≤ Mk2b ) implies pk2a˜ = Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2a˜ for points ofH , which yields
(Mk1b∗ + ck2b∗ − ck2a˜ )βk2a˜ + γ k1b + γ k2a˜ = 0.
As γ k2a˜ = −Mk2a˜ βk2a˜ , one obtains γ k1b = (Mk2b∗ −Mk1b∗ )βk2a˜ and the result follows. 
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